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The	election	of	losers
On	21	June,	Serbia	held	parliamentary	elections.	The	elections,	which	were	boycotted	by	many
opposition	parties,	saw	the	Serbian	Progressive	Party,	led	by	Serbia’s	President	Aleksandar	Vučić,
win	a	clear	majority.	Florian	Bieber	writes	that	while	Vučić’s	victory	appears	absolute,	he	must	also
rank	as	one	of	the	key	losers	from	the	contest:	a	parliament	without	an	opposition	cannot	serve	as	a
fig	leaf	to	legitimise	the	supposedly	democratic	rule	of	the	President.
One	person	appears	to	have	won	the	election.	His	face	was	everywhere,	his	name	was	on	the	ballot,	though	not	as
a	candidate,	and	the	virtual	rallies	were	dominated	by	him.	Aleksandar	Vučić	is	the	apparent	winner	of	Serbia’s
parliamentary	election	last	Sunday.	While	as	President,	his	official	standing	is	above	party	politics,	it	was	clear	that
the	victory	of	Vučić	was	absolute.	His	Serbian	Progressive	Party	(SNS)	won	around	62	percent	of	the	vote	and
gained	191	of	250	seats	in	parliament,	around	76%	of	the	seats.	The	large	majority	opens	the	door	to	constitutional
changes	that	would	allow	the	regime,	like	in	Hungary,	to	tailor	the	constitution	to	the	needs	of	the	ruling	party.
His	long-term	coalition	partner,	the	Socialists,	and	their	allies	gained	10.4%	and	32	seats,	and	the	Serbian	Patriotic
Alliance,	the	vehicle	of	New	Belgrade	Mayor	Aleksandar	Šapić,	gained	11	seats,	just	passing	the	3%	threshold	with
3.64%.	The	threshold	was	lowered	from	5%	to	3%	just	weeks	before	the	election	in	a	transparent	effort	by	the	ruling
SNS	to	boost	the	representation	of	minor	parties	in	parliament	to	weaken	the	effects	of	the	opposition	boycott.
The	remaining	16	seats	are	held	by	minority	parties,	which	have	a	lower	threshold.	The	only	opposition	in	the
Serbian	parliament	are	two	Albanian	MPs	from	the	majority	Albanian	municipalities	of	Bujanovac	and	Preševo,	as
the	minority	parties	cooperated	with	the	previous	governments	of	the	Progressive	Party	and	Šapić	also	did	not	run
against	the	government.	It	is	this	resounding	victory	that	makes	the	outcome	a	defeat	for	Vučić.	A	parliament
without	an	opposition	cannot	serve	as	a	fig	leaf	to	legitimise	the	supposedly	democratic	rule	of	the	President.	Had
more	of	the	21	running	parties	and	groups	entered	parliament,	such	as	the	different	far	right	and	fascist	groups	or	a
few	scattered	democrats	and	reformists,	the	Progressive	Party	could	claim	that	Serbia	had	a	pluralist	parliament.
Now,	it	does	not	and	thus	reveals	the	authoritarian	nature	of	the	regime.
Aleksandar	Vučić,	Credit:	Belgrade	Security	Forum	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
The	opposition	lost	as	well.	While	turnout	was	probably	lower	than	official	numbers,	it	was	according	to	the
independent	monitoring	NGO	CRTA	around	48	percent,	thus	8	to	9	percent	lower	than	the	previous	parliamentary
elections	in	2016.	This	is	a	minor	drop,	that	could	not	be	claimed	solely	by	the	opposition,	but	rather	also	by	Covid-
19	and	voter	apathy.	Clearly	the	main	effort	by	the	regime	has	been	directed	toward	pushing	up	voter	participation,
as	most	irregularities	CRTA	noted	focused	on	pushing	up	voter	numbers	and	SNS	officials	appear	to	have	called
potential	voters	on	election	day	to	pressure	them	to	vote.
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The	boycotting	opposition	has	succeeded	in	delegitimising	the	opposition	parties	that	participated,	such	as	the
Movement	of	Free	Citizens	headed	by	Sergej	Trifunović	that	only	gained	1.5%	of	the	vote,	or	the	United	Democratic
Serbia	party	that	gained	less	than	0.9%.	At	the	same	time	the	opposition	that	boycotted	is	far	from	united.	The	once
large	Democratic	Party	has	been	marred	by	infighting,	including	a	scuffle	at	the	party	headquarters	on	election	day
between	different	wings.	Otherwise,	the	opposition	is	an	uneasy	alliance	between	the	far-right	Dveri,	unpopular	split
offs	of	the	previously	ruling	Democratic	party	and	a	few	other	groups.	Now	out	of	parliament,	it	is	cut	off	from
funding:	without	a	clear	strategy	and	few	international	allies	and	contacts,	the	opposition	has	a	rough	time	ahead.
The	EU	is	the	final	loser	in	the	elections.	Serbia	has	long	been	hailed,	uncritically,	as	the	front	runner	in	the	EU
enlargement	process.	Now,	it	is	confronted	with	a	parliament	that	lacks	a	democratic	mandate	and	a	regime	whose
authoritarian	nature	has	become	more	visible.	A	joint	statement	by	the	High	Representative	Josep	Borrell	and
Neighbourhood	and	Enlargement	Commissioner	Olivér	Várhelyi	was	strikingly	critical,	noting	limited	voter	choice
and	the	media	dominance	of	the	ruling	party.	The	European	parties	fell,	unsurprisingly,	along	partisan	lines.	The
Socialists	and	Progressives	correctly	called	the	elections	a	mockery	of	democracy	and	demanded	a	slowdown	of
accession,	whereas	Donald	Tusk	of	the	European	People’s	Party	congratulated	their	party	family	associate	SNS,
only	noting	ominously	that	the	“more	power,	the	more	responsibility.”
The	enlargement	process	has	been	seriously	compromised	by	the	elections.	Serbia	has	been	negotiating	accession
for	more	than	six	years,	the	same	period	during	which	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	has	been	backsliding
according	to	every	indicator	and	all	organisations	monitoring	democracy	globally,	including	Freedom	House,	the
Bertelsmann	Transformation	Index,	the	VDem	Institute,	and	the	Economist	Democracy	Index.	The	EU	institutions,
with	the	notable	exception	of	the	parliament,	have	been	strikingly	silent	on	this.	If	the	EU	returns	to	business	as
usual	after	the	election,	it	will	not	only	encourage	the	further	consolidation	of	authoritarianism	in	Serbia,	but	also
among	others	in	the	region,	including	Montenegro	and	Albania.
More	importantly,	it	suggests	that	the	EU	is	not	just	struggling	with	keeping	autocrats	in	check	within	the	EU	but
also	during	the	accession	process,	where	more	tools	are	available.	To	confront	the	authoritarian	drift,	the	EU	needs
to	engage	with	Serbia.	Back	in	2014,	the	EU	at	first	ignored	the	authoritarianism	of	the	Gruevski	government	and
the	eviction	of	the	opposition	in	North	Macedonia.	Only	the	2015	wiretapping	scandal	triggered	more	sustained	EU
engagement.	The	risk	is	that	in	Serbia	the	political	alternatives	will	become	more	Eurosceptic,	as	they	see	the
government	backed	by	the	EU	and	its	member	states	and	as	many	of	the	parties	already	today	oppose	European
integration.
A	renewed	EU	engagement	requires	several	components,	namely	a	meaningful	mediation	between	government
and	opposition	on	how	to	bring	the	opposition	back	into	the	political	process	based	on	tackling	some	of	the	most
serious	democratic	restrictions.	Furthermore,	a	rule	of	law	mission,	such	as	the	Priebe	report	drafted	in	2015	by
independent	experts	that	would	identify	the	shortcomings	and	priorities	for	reform,	and	a	follow-up	process.	The
European	party	families	should	work	together	on	their	assessment	of	democracy	rather	than	making	democracy	a
partisan	issue	in	the	Western	Balkans.	Bipartisan	statements	and	mediation	by	MEPs	from	the	largest	European
parties	would	reduce	the	risk	of	authoritarianism	being	further	facilitated	by	partisan	rift.
Finally,	the	Commission,	the	European	Parliament	and	the	member	states	need	to	consider	the	full	range	of	options
regarding	the	accession	talks	themselves.	These	options	include	not	opening	new	chapters	in	negotiations,	which
would	represent	a	low-level	signal.	More	serious	would	be	to	evoke	the	imbalance	clause,	which	has	been	part	of
the	accession	negotiations	for	eight	years.	It	allows	talks	to	be	frozen	on	all	chapters	if	not	enough	progress	is
made	in	regard	to	the	rule	of	law.
Finally,	the	new	methodology,	set	up	by	the	Commission	in	response	to	France’s	veto	over	accession	talks	with
North	Macedonia	and	Albania,	offers	further	tools	to	put	pressure	on	accession	candidates.	It	allows	member	states
to	put	negotiations	in	some	areas	on	hold	and	re-open	closed	chapters,	as	well	as	reassessing	funding	and	other
benefits	of	cooperation.	The	most	serious	option	would	entail	suspending	accession	talks	altogether.
While	the	latter	option	might	be	counterproductive	at	the	moment,	it	would	be	good	to	consider	some	of	the
intermediate	measures.	The	suspension	of	accession	talks,	however,	has	to	be	a	credible	threat	unless	the	Serbian
government	makes	some	clear	and	verifiable	steps	to	restoring	democratic	institutions.	Considering	the	tools	the
EU	has	available	now	to	insist	on	the	core	values	of	the	EU	in	the	accession	talks,	not	using	them	would	cement
the	election	result	as	a	lost	opportunity	for	Serbia	and	the	EU.
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Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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